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Observations on Cost and Schedule Performance
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1) When compared to the 2012 portfolio, the number of programs in the current portfolio decreased from 85 to 80, and overall 
cost increased by $14.1 billion from $1,501 billion to $1,515 billion. The decrease in programs follows a trend from the 
past 3 years.
2) For the 80 programs in the 2013 portfolio we found cost growth of $12.6 billion and an average schedule delay in delivering 
operational capability of 2 months over the past year. From first full estimates, the total cost increased by nearly $448 billion
with an average delay of 28 months.
3) While the overall cost of the portfolio increased, 50 of the 80 programs reduced their costs over the past year. The majority 
of the net cost growth can be attributed to a single program, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV).
4) When the effects of quantity changes are accounted for, DOD improved buying power on 64 percent of the programs in 
the portfolio over the past year.
5) While the short-term trends are positive, they should be balanced against longer term metrics discussed by GAO, OMB, and 
DOD in 2008. Fifty-five percent of programs had less than 10 percent growth over the past 5 years and 44 percent had less 
than 15 percent growth since first full estimates.
6) The total acquisition cost of the portfolio is driven by the 10 costliest programs which represent 59 percent of the total cost. 
These 10 programs alone incurred a $15.4 billion increase over the past year while the other 70 programs reported a net 
decrease of $2.8 billion. 
7) The majority of the cost of the portfolio is concentrated in two system types and the amount and type of cost growth from first 
full estimate, as well as the schedule delay, varied significantly by system type.
8) DOD has already been appropriated more than $833 billion for the current portfolio, leaving approximately $682 billion to be 
funded, mostly for procurement. Approximately 45 percent of the remaining cost represents growth from first full estimates. 
Almost two-thirds of the funding is needed for ten programs, 35 percent for the F-35 program alone. 
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DOD Portfolio Cost and Size, 2004-2013
In comparison to the 2012 portfolio, the number of programs in the current portfolio decreased 
from 85 to 80. Its overall cost increased by $14.1 billion, primarily in procurement, from $1,501 
billion to $1,515 billion. The decrease in portfolio size follows a trend from the past 3 years.
PRELIMINARY
The 80 programs in the 2013 portfolio grew by $12.6 billion in total cost over the past year 
and initial operating capability slipped an average of 2 months. From first full estimates, 
the total cost increased by nearly $448 billion with an average delay of 28 months in 
operating capability.
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Changes in DOD’s 2013 Portfolio of 80 Current MDAPs over the Past Year
Fiscal year 2014 dollars in billions
Estimated
current 












Total estimated research and development cost $286.7 $288.7 $2.0 0.7%
Total estimated procurement cost 1,201.6 1,213.2 11.5 1.0
Total other acquisition costs 14.3 13.3 -0.9 -6.3
Total estimated acquisition cost 1,502.6 1,515.2 12.6 0.8
Average delay in delivering initial capabilities -- -- 2 months 2.8
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
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While the overall cost of the portfolio has increased, 50 of the 80 programs within the 
portfolio reduced their costs over the past year. The majority of the net cost growth can be 
attributed to the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
reported the most significant cost decrease.
Distribution of the Total Acquisition Cost Change for the 2013 Portfolio
PRELIMINARY
Page 7
When the effects of quantity changes are accounted for, DOD improved buying 
power on 64 percent of the programs in the portfolio over the past year.
Increases in Buying Power for the 2013 Portfolio over the Past Year
















Increased buying power 51 -$23.0 $4.9 -$27.9
Procurement cost decreased with no quantity change 35 -22.6 0 -22.6
Quantity increased with less cost increase than anticipated 10 4.8 7.9 -3.1
Quantity decreased with more cost decrease than anticipated 6 -5.2 -3.0 -2.2
Decreased buying power 25 $34.6 $22.4 $12.1
Procurement cost increased with no quantity change 16 4.7 0 4.7
Quantity increased with more cost increase than anticipated 5 32.1 25.3 6.8
Quantity decreased with less cost decrease than anticipated 4 -2.3 -2.9 0.5
No change in buying power 4 $0 $0 $0
Totals 80 $11.5 $27.3 -$15.8
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
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DOD has already received more than $833 billion for the 2013 portfolio, leaving $682 billion to go, 
mostly for procurement. About 45 percent of this represents growth from first full estimates. 
Almost two-thirds of remaining funding is for ten programs, 35 percent for the F-35 program.
Future Funding and Future Funding Required Due to Cost Growth from First Full Estimates




Amount of future funding 
due to cost growth from 
first full estimates
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter $239.6 $107.0
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 42.9 38.4
KC-46 Tanker 40.8 0
Virginia-class Submarine 28.2 16.2
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 23.0 0
CH-53K Super Stallion 20.7 7.4
Littoral Combat Ship 19.6 19.6
CVN 78 Class Aircraft Carrier 17.5 0
P-8A Poseidon 16.8 1.7
DDG 51 Destroyer 14.0 14.0
10 programs with the largest future funding requirements $463.2 $204.3
Total for remaining programs $218.8 $107.3
2013 portfolio totals $682.0 $311.6
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Future funding is measured as all fiscal year 2014 funding to completion of procurement.
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DOD's Acquisition Cycle and GAO Knowledge Points
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F-22 Increment  3.2B and AMDR did not 
demonstrate all their critical technologies 
in a realistic environment.
AMDR failed to hold a system-level 
preliminary design review prior to system 
development. They did receive a waiver 
for this requirement.
Both programs, intend to constrain their 
development phase to 6 years or less. 
Of the 36 other programs we assessed, 
only 4 fully matured their technologies, 8 
completed preliminary design review 
prior to system development, and 19 
planned for a constrained development 
phase.
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Observations on Knowledge Point 1: Resources and Requirements Match
PRELIMINARY
KC-46 and JLTV demonstrated design 
stability by releasing 90 percent of planned 
engineering drawings, WIN-T 3  does not 
track this metric.
None demonstrated all program critical 
technologies in a realistic environment prior 
to design review.
None tested an early system-level integrated 
prototype.
All three satisfied some of the best practices 
related to preparation for production.
Of the 30 other programs we assessed for 
this review, 6 released 90% of their design 
drawings and 3 tested system level 
prototypes. Significant numbers had 
conducted activities to plan for production.
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Observations on Knowledge Point 2: Product Design is Stable
PRELIMINARY
Paladin Integrated Management and 
G/ATOR both reported mature technologies 
and stable designs entering production.
Neither program has demonstrated that all 
their critical manufacturing processes are 
in statistical control.
Only G/ATOR demonstrated performance 
through the testing of a production-
representative prototype or used a pilot 
production line to demonstrate processes. 
Few of the other 16 programs in our 
assessment implemented these practices; 
3 had critical processes in control and 6 
had used a pilot production line.
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Observations on Knowledge Point 3: Manufacturing Processes are Mature
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Observations on Acquisition Reform
1. Only 30 of 56 current and future programs we assessed established an affordability constraint as 
directed by the “Better Buying Power” memos, an implementation rate that has not improved from 
our prior assessment. All programs with a cap or goal in place reported they are on track to meet it.
2. About 82 percent of the current programs we assessed have conducted a “should-cost” analysis as 
directed by the “Better Buying Power” memos, resulting in anticipated savings of approximately $24 
billion. Over half of this amount has or will be reallocated from these programs for other priorities. 
3. Many of the future programs we assessed do not plan to conduct competitive prototyping before 
development start and many current programs do not have acquisition strategies that ensure 
competition through the end of production, as required by the Weapon System Acquisition Reform 
Act of 2009. Fifteen future and current programs reported they will not take actions to promote any 
of the competitive measures enumerated in the act before or after development start.
4. All but one of the 38 current programs we assessed had conducted a configuration steering board 
review, as required by law, with 29 programs reporting that this review occurred during the past 
year. Only 10 programs reported that changes were approved or recommended at their last review.
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• Concurrency in this analysis is overlap in production and development testing.
• 15 out of the 18 programs we assessed that have started production intend to or have 
already executed 30 percent or more of their developmental testing concurrent with 
production. 
• 7 of these 15 programs have completed developmental testing with 4 reporting 
quality problems during production. 
• For the 8 programs currently conducting concurrent testing and production, 5 
expect to have more than 10 percent of their procurement quantities under 
contract before developmental testing is completed.
• 12 other programs we assessed are scheduled to make a production decision in the 
near future.
• 6 of them intend to execute 30 percent or more of their developmental testing 
concurrent with production.
• 2 of these 6 expect to have more than 10 percent of their total procurement 
quantity under contract before developmental testing ends.
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• In addition to the portfolio assessments, we produced brief “Quick Look” 
assessments of individual programs analyzing their cost, schedule, and 
performance as well as their adherence to knowledge-based best practices.
• 37 2-page assessments on current major defense acquisition programs, 
generally in development or early production.
• 19 1-page assessments on programs in technology development , were 
recently cancelled or curtailed, or are well into production.
• For a copy of the full report: www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-340SP
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Comparison of Two Major Programs: F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter and KC-46 Tanker
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• Programs are using different overall acquisition and 
contracting approaches
• F-35 began with limited knowledge, high levels of 
concurrency, and has experienced significant cost 
and schedule problems
• KC-46 began with higher levels of knowledge, limited 
concurrency, and is currently tracking closely to its 
cost and schedule baselines 
F-35 and KC-46 Comparison
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Top-level Program Comparison
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Single-Step (15-16 years)
Cost Plus
25% (2 of 8)
around 12 years
STOVL 46%; CTOL 3%; CV 43%
Development: $21B (60%)
Procurement: $134B (68%)





100% (3 of 3)
around 1½  years
90%
Development: fixed price cap






Technologies Nearing Maturity at 
Development Start
(DOD standard is TRL6)
Concurrency 
(Development Start to End of Initial 
Operational Testing)
Design Maturity at Critical Design 
Review






(initial operational capability date)
Key Characteristic
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency
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Efforts to Improve DOD’s Weapon Acquisition 
Program Processes and Outcomes
Page 23For more information, contact Cheryl Andrew 937-258-7956.
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Recent Legislation, Initiatives, and Experiences are 
Incorporated in New 5000.02 Policy
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• PDR before start of 
development
• Competition throughout 
acquisition lifecycle
• Affordability trade-offs at 
Milestone B
• Material Development 
Decision for all programs
• Shorter program timelines
• Treats affordability like a KPP
• Portfolio analyses to eliminate 
redundancies
• Stresses use of systems engineering 
analysis to show how cost varies with 
schedule and design parameters.
• Stronger partnerships with the 
requirements community
• Total acquisition workforce improvements
• Decreases emphasis on 
rules and increases 
emphasis on process intent 
and thoughtful program 
planning
• Includes 4 example 
program models, tailored for 
the product being acquired
PRELIMINARY
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We Previously Found that Organizations Established by 
the Reform Act are Influencing Program Decisions
Program Requirements  Cost and Schedule  Testing Reliability 
Before Milestone B 
Ground Combat Vehicle    
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle*    




Global Hawk   
Gray Eagle    
KC‐46 Tanker  
Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe 
Remote Minehunting System   
Small Diameter Bomb II   
JLTV and SSC held a Milestone B review during the course of our review.
PRELIMINARY
Examples of New Organizations’ Influence on Weapon 
Acquisition Programs
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Requirements: The GCV began with 
inflexible requirements and an 
aggressive schedule. Systems 
Engineering participated in a review that 
led GCV to reduce requirements by 25% 
and prioritize the remainder. 
Cost and Schedule Estimates: The 
CAPE has reviewed the Joint Strike 
Fighter many times. After a 2010 Nunn 
McCurdy breach, it did an independent 
estimate that led OSD to extend the test 
schedule, cut quantities, and increase 
development costs by $4.6 billion. 
PRELIMINARY
Examples of New Organizations’ Influence on Weapon 
Acquisition Programs
Developmental Testing: Based on DT&E 
recommendations, Small Diameter Bomb 
II officials added $41 million to the budget 
for a 28-shot test program. This increased 
program knowledge and reduced 
operational test risks.
Reliability: Based on recommendations 
from DT&E, officials added two test 
vehicles and 40,000 more miles to the 
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle’s reliability test 
program. The reliability goal was also 
reduced by 33 percent, making it more 
realistic and achievable. 
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GAO Acquisition Efficiencies Review
• Mandated by Section 824 of FY 2014 NDAA
• “Identify the…processes and procedures that provide little 
or no value added, or for which any value added is 
outweighed by the cost or schedule delay of the processes 
or procedures.
• Elements of organizations and layers of review that are 
redundant or unnecessary, add cost, or create schedule 
delays to the acquisition of weapon systems without 
commensurate value.”




• What are the best practices of leading commercial companies 
and successful DOD programs for establishing an efficient 
development process? 
• What key changes is DOD making to improve the efficiency of 
its acquisition process?




Primary Areas of Focus (DOD and Commercial)
• Organizational Structure (The Who)
• Levels and layers of decision making
• Process (The How, The When)
• Milestone/Gate procedures and documentation required
• Reviews (The What)
• Purpose, Frequency, Timing, Participants, Deliverables, Metrics, and Quality of 
Reviews
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Milestone A Milestone CMilestone B
Key Enablers
• Solid business case
• Incremental acquisition strategies
• Clear, well defined, stable requirements
• Realistic cost and schedule estimates
• Stable funding
• Investing in early planning and systems engineering
• Leveraging mature technology
• Leadership continuity
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